PEJAK:
PKK’S “SEARCH FORA NEW MISSION IN THEREGION”
Arif
KESKÝN
ASAM
Middle East Expert - Turkey
akeskin@asam.org.tr
PEJAK (Free
Life Party of Kurdistan) comes to the agenda nowadays in
each discussion about PKK, Northern Iraq, cross-border
operation and relationship between US-Turkey-Iran. The role
that PEJAK plays in these discussions appears as a key
concept which may determine existence, direction and destiny
of PKK in the region. There isn’t much information about
this organization which became increasingly important lately
and there are question marks in our minds. There are many
obstacles to get through regarding the birth and
establishment of PEJAK; its relationship with the PKK, Iran,
Northern Iraq and the US. The aim of this article is to
respond these questions. This article is composed of four
chapters. In the first chapter, the establishment process
and aim of the organization will be discussed. In the second
chapter, the environment and the factors that transform this
organization into a regional power will be analyzed. In the
third chapter, PKK’s “search for a New Mission” will be
discussed and in the fourth chapter, the status of PEJAK
within the national policy equation of Iran will be
examined. This study will be finalized with a brief general
evaluation chapter.
Establishment and Purposes
The capture
of Abdollah Ojalan put the terrorist organization PKK into a
shock and uncertainty for a while. The organization put its
effort to come through this crisis by changing its name into
KADEK in 2002 and KONGRE-GEL in 2003. In this period PKK not
only got into an ideological crisis but also an
organizational crisis. At that stage Abdollah Ojalan
defended the thesis “democratic-ecologic society” and
“democratic confederalism” in this regard. This thesis
showed that PKK lost its touch with its “grand Kurdistan”
dream that it have been supporting for years and a
condefedaralism modeled government was proposed to the Kurds
who are living in four different countries. This approach
was a “search for a solution” to “the Kurdish issue” within
the countries they live in. KONGRE-GEL was established in
2003 as an umbrella organization based on this proposition.
Under this umbrella the idea of the establishing an
organization and a party in their own way and in the four
countries where the Kurds live was brought to the agenda. As
a result the decision to establish KADEK in Turkey, PEJAK in
Iran, Democratic Solution Party in Iraq, Democratic Unity
Party in Syria was taken. After a while the idea of
KONGRE-GEL and KADEK was put aside and PKK was used again.
The party established in Syria was not successful. The
reason for this is the organization might be weakened when
the Syrian PKK members left the organization and participate
in the Democratic Unity Party. The Democratic Solution Party
did well in Iraq and so did PEJAK in Iran.
There are
different statements regarding the establishment date of
PEJAK. According to its founders the idea of establishment
was thought in 1993 2 but the establishment of PEJAK was
delayed for long due to the relationship between Iran-PKK.
Besides, the aforementioned relationship paved the way to
the establishment of PEJAK at the same time. Iran tolerated
the political activities of the terrorist organization PKK
in Iran for a long time. Thanks to this support Iran gained
intelligence support from the PKK against its opponent
Kurdish groups and sometimes they carried out joint
operations against these groups. This also coincides with
the time when Iran supported PKK to weaken Turkey. PKK found
an easy opportunity to propagate in Iran and even the books
of Abdollah Ojalan were published by the approval of the
Ministry of Culture. The activities of the PKK was not only
limited to this but also it had initiatives to establish a
Kurdish Institute in Iran and a Kurdish city by the name of
Mokriyan on the Turkish-Iranian border. The relationship
with Kurdish students and MP’s were fostered. When Khatemi
came into power in 1997, these initiatives became
multidimensional. The democratization rhetoric of Khatemi
gave new opportunities to the Kurds. The reformists made
promises on the amelioration of “the situation of the
Kurds”. Iranian Kurdish parties supported this process which
gave hope to the Kurds. The PKK continued its activities
although the Kurds sank into despair in the second term of
Khatemi.
Following
the arrest of Ojalan the psychological environment among the
Iranian Kurds returned positively to PKK. Abdollah Ojalan
and consequently PKK were identified with the concepts of
“mistreated” and “heroism”. At that time PKK accelerated its
activities. Iranian government did not do much to prevent
these activities. The government which killed the party
members of IKDP and KOMULE when captured, presented the PKK
supporters an area of free activity. When they were
captured, they were released shortly.
The failure
following the positive environment created by the first term
of the Khatemi government led to a great despair. The
student formations and political organizations of that time
searched new ways. In that environment the PKK supporters
rethought about the idea of organization. In 2002 they were
organized under the name of “Democratic Unity Movement” but
these initiatives failed. The new mission definition of
KONGRE-GEL and the US deployment in Iraq paved the way for
all these efforts to come to a different point. In this
process PEJAK started its activities by holding its first
congress in 2004. PEJAK has two wings. The first wing,
political wing, is organized as two active groups composed
of youth (KCR) and women (YJRK). The second wing, military
wing, is named as HRK (Hezen Rizgariya Kurdistan).
PEJAK
(Kurdistan Free Life Party) states explicitly in its Rules
And Regulations that, its ideological basis comes from PKK
and Abdollah Ojalan. PEJAK deems “PKK as the greatest
movement in the Kurdish history“ and defines its lines as
“Apoism”. It states its aim as establishing “Iranian Federal
Democratic Republic” and defines the acts of terrorism
within the concept of “legitimate defense”. In the
above-mentioned Rules And Regulations the KONGRE-GEL is
defined as “the basic umbrella organization” and it is
obligatory to preserve the organic relationship and follow
the same line with it. The organization uses the PKK tools
in all its propaganda and political activities; disseminates
the books, articles, speeches of Ojalan to recruit militants
within Iran. Furthermore the high level cadre of PEJAK has
fulfilled “serious” missions within different units of the
PKK before. On the other hand PEJAK’s camp in Ghandil is
“protected” by PKK and PKK gives military and ideological
training to PEJAK.
How did
PEJAK gain influence?
The
information regarding the Kurdish population and their
settlements in Iran is of major importance in understanding
the extent of influence of PEJAK. There are approximately
five million Kurds in Iran. While they form a majority in
cities such as Kurdistan, Karmanshah and Ilam, they form a
minority in Western Azerbaijan, Lorestan and Horasan.9 There
are sectarian and dialectical differences among them. They
talk Kermanji in Western Azerbaijan and Khorasan; Sorani in
Kurdistan; Karmanshahi in Ilam and Karmanshah. 30 percent of
the Kurds are Shiites. While Kurds from Ilam and
Karmanshah.are Shiite; other Kurds are mostly Sunnis and
Shafis. Dialectical, sectarian and geographical
distributions of the Kurds influence their political
tendencies. The Shiite Kurds have a tendency of being close
to the center. For example there is a serious Persianism in
Karmanshah. The Sunnite Kurds in the Kurdistan Province
attach themselves to the Kurds in Northern Iraq while the
Kermanci Kurds in Western Azerbaijan attach themselves to
Turkish Kurds. The PEJAK’s base consists of Kurds living in
Azerbaijan province. Furthermore, the PEJAK desires to
spread among the Sorani Kurds as well. It started to gain
influence also among Kurdish Shiites in Iran. It gains power
especially in Iranian cities of Karmanshah and Ilam as
Shiites, who constitute 30 percent of Kurds, do not approve
the other Kurdish groups very much. However, the PEJAK
started to gain influence among the Shiite Kurds by breaking
this resistance.
The PEJAK’s
seeds were planted during the period of good relations
between the PKK and Iran. The PKK terror organization
attempted to grow in Iran within the framework of Iranian
security support and wanted to bring its activities in an
organized form. For this reason, there is a perception among
many opposition groups in Iran that “the PEJAK is an
offspring of the Iran regime.” The interesting point is that
during the period following its establishment, the PEJAK
continued its activities overtly in certain regions of Iran.
The mass,
which the PEJAK and the PKK influenced in Iran, consists of
people who received education and higher education. Since
the Iranian Kurds did not carry out many theoretical works,
they were influenced considerably by the cultural work of
the PKK. Moreover, the PKK replaced pishmarga concept with
“guerilla” phenomenon. And this attracts young generation
seeking their identity. Another matter of influence for
Kurds in Iran was women rights. Promises are made for young
Kurdish students to educate abroad on scholarships and for
unemployed people to be employed in Northern Iraq.
Another
reason for the PEJAK’s growth was that Iran’s traditional
Kurdish groups got weakened in Kurdish regions. Iranian
Kurds have two significant parties named Iranian Kurdistan
Democratic Party (IKDP) and KOMULE. In 1943, a group of
young people came together in Savujboulagh (Mahabat) and
established the first covert Kurdish organization, the
Kurdish Revival Society (Kömala-Jiani-Kürt). This
organization later turned into the Kurdistan Democratic
Party in 1945. Since that day this party has undertaken a
significant role in all events and historical developments
in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, the organization increasingly
became passive after 1991. And KOMULE was established by the
people who split from the Iranian Communist Party. This
constitution gained power especially following 1979 Iranian
Islamic Revolution. However, it was also weakened over time.
These parties’ presence in Northern Iraq lost their
independence and their activities went under the command of
Talabani and Barzani. These groups were neutralized upon the
request of Iran, within the framework of Iran-Northern Iraq
relations. In this process, parties’ energy was spent on
inter-party disputes and settling up and there was
insufficiency in policymaking. The bloody conflict in the
KOMULE camps in Northern Iraq in the recent period also
constituted the last example of this internal settling up.
Another
reason for the PEJAK’s strengthening is that it benefits all
the means of the PKK. Iran’s other Kurdish groups do not
have the media support (ROJ TV) that PEJAK has. As a matter
of fact, ROJ TV is watched and PKK-PEJAK propaganda is made
in IKDP and KOMULE camps.
PKK’s
Search for a “New Mission”
Establishing the PEJAK, the PKK wanted to take part in the
US “regional speculation and searches”. The settlement of
USA in Iraq caused a deep-rooted change in the PKK’s
strategy and regional stand and the PKK started to alienate
from its traditional supporters Iran and Syria. This
situation indicates that the PKK is in search for a mission
within the context of USA. Making good use of regional
conflict areas, the PKK wanted to take part in the scope of
regional plans of USA. The PKK realized that the regional
and global equilibrium has changed and thus it can not trust
its traditional supporters in the region any more. It has
also come out that Iran and Syria are placed in corner by
the West and they do not have the power to support the PKK
against Turkey any longer. For this reason, the PKK started
to locate itself in the region so that it is of use for USA.
The PKK has the potential to carry out this new mission as
it is an organization with a cross border structure.
Different from the other Kurdish groups, it has militants
with Iranian, Syrian, Iraqi and Turkish nationalities. And
this provides the PKK with an opportunity to carry out its
activities in an extensive area. In addition, it has a
tendency and power to act free from the Northern Iraqi
Kurds. Since the other Kurdish groups of Iran are
excessively dependent on Barzani and Talabani, they do not
have this potential. As a matter of fact, the Iranian
Kurdish groups preferred to protect the “Regional Kurdish
Administration” in Northern Iraq as their fundamental
politics. Because of the close relations between Iran and
Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups, other Kurdish groups
mentioned above were silenced. On the contrary, the PEJAK
came on stage and grew in this period.
All these
developments changed the relations between both the PKK and
the regional states. While the PKK was Turkey’s problem
before, it became a problem for Syria and Iran as well. This
complicated the solution to the PKK problem even more as the
solution to the PKK problem went beyond the scope of USA and
Turkey and as it linked to the fate of the relations between
the USA, Syria and Iran. Although Iran and Syria seemed to
side with Turkey, their positioning the PKK as against
themselves places the US stand regarding the PKK in a harder
situation.
There are
contradictory statements over the relations between the
PEJAK and USA. While USA considers the PKK as a terrorist
organization, it makes an unequal treatment by not making
the same statement regarding the PKK. The US administration
states that they do not have any relations with the PEJAK.
However, the PEJAK’s statements and the general view is that
USA supports the PEJAK.
With the
coinciding of the PKK’s change of strategy and the PEJAK’s
establishment with the period of increasing tense relations
between USA and Iran, the search of USA for an organization
capable of struggling against Iran put the significance of
the PEJAK on the agenda. Within this frame of reference,
some features of the PEJAK attract USA. Although the Iranian
Kurdish groups, except for the PEJAK, have long carried out
an armed struggle, they are not in a desire to do so for the
time being. Furthermore, the Arabs and the Baluchis in Iran
also do not have a powerful armed organization. And the
Azerbaijani Turks favor political and democratic struggle
and they do not have any military structure. On the other
hand, the opposition outside the scope of ethnic nationality
does not have a significant influence inside Iran. The most
powerful of these is Mujahedeene Khalq. Besides being on the
US terror organizations list, the organization is also the
“blood enemy” of the Iraqi Shiites and the Kurds as it once
was close to Saddam. These points increase the significance
of yhe PEJAK in the eyes of USA. Also the unwillingness of
USA to meet the requests of Turkey on the PKK issue does
have a sense within this frame of reference since it is in
need of the PEJAK.
PEJAK in
the Iranian Political Equilibrium
PEJAK tends
to gain power not only among the Kurds but also throughout
Iran. However, PEJAK’s succeeding in this aim is also not so
easy. As a matter of fact, although it called the opposing
Persian groups in Iran to cooperate, it did not receive a
positive answer. These groups felt a deep distrust of the
PEJAK from the day of its birth. Iranian opposition
perceived PEJAK as an “Iranian project”. For them, the
Iranian state targeted with the establishment of the PEJAK
to control and direct the Kurdish opposition. Obviously,
this comment was made taking into account the close
relations between the PKK and Iran. Although the PEJAK
reduced this distrust to a certain extent as a result of its
skirmishes with Iran, it still faces serious problems.
Moreover, Persian opposition perceives the PEJAK as a
disrupter. Another problem for the Iranian Persian
opposition groups is the relations of the PEJAK with the PKK
and this relationship increases the lack of confidence about
PEJAK. According to these groups, the close relationship
between PKK and the regime of Iran has worsened only in the
recent period. Moreover, the regional balances could make
PKK close to Iran again. At such kind of a phase, the power
of PEJAK to act independently would be under question. The
discourse of PEJAK deepens this doubt. Existing like “the
aim is to change the regime but not to overturn it”, this
discourse leaves an opportunity to bargain with the Iranian
regime.
The other
Kurdish groups in Iran also do not find PEJAK sympathetic to
themselves. Willing to struggle in a political and
democratic period, the Iranian Kurdish groups endure to
consider PEJAK as a trap of Iran. According to this opinion,
the military conflicts of PEJAK channeled Iran to deploy its
army into the region in which the Kurds are living. And this
fact gives way to the opportunity of suppressing the
political activities of the Iranian Kurds and the chance of
restraining the Kurds of Northern Iran. According to some
Kurdish groups and leaders PEJAK and PKK give way to between
Turkey, Syria and Iran to create cooperation between each
other, which is not for the benefit of the Kurds in the
region. This fact pushes Turkey and Iran into a “violent and
aggressive” position against North Iraq and makes the
administration in the North of Iraq compensate to Iran and
Turkey. These Kurdish groups located in the North of Iraq
claim that “while Iran was bombing the North of Iraq, the
villages were burned but nothing happened only to PEJAK.”
Due to this opinion, the PEJAK-PKK operations bring with
itself the danger of destroying the Regional Kurdish
Administration which is a young Kurdish formation. On the
other hand, it is an influential factor that makes it
difficult for the USA to support the north of Iraq.
The most
concerned and insecure group in Iran that views the
activities of PEJAK is the Azerbaijani Turks. According to
the Azerbaijanis, PEJAK claims the historical lands of
Azerbaijani Turks as “the lands of Kurds” in accordance with
the “Great Kurdistan” dream. In this respect, they made some
attempts. As it is pointed out above, PKK has sought to
establish a Kurdish province (otsan) called Mokriyan on the
Turkish-Iranian border after 1997. But this attempt was
suspended because of the sensitiveness of the Azerbaijani
Turks. On the other hand, channeling PEJAK-PKK to Iran means
that the conflict could spread to the city of Urumiyah in
which the Azerbeijani Turks live. And this increases the
possibility that a Turk-Kurd conflict could be break out in
the West Azerbaijan. Even it is not known in Turkey
completely, the emotional and psychological ground for a
Turk-Kurd conflict in the West Azerbaijan province of Iran
is arising. According to the Azerbaijanis, PEJAK and PKK
follow the project of Turk-Kurd conflict in the region.
PKK’s constant having of Urumiyah, the most ancient city of
Azerbaijan in the map of “Great Kurdistan” creates an
anxiety. This fact produces a potential of hot-conflict
between the Kurds and the Azerbaijanis at the border region
of Iran and Turkey.
Conclusion and General Assessment
Regionalization of PKK is a process for Turkey that shelters
both the opportunities and threads. On one hand, the problem
becomes a problem of Iran and Syria as well. This case
facilitates Turkey’s search for the regional cooperation on
the PKK issue and makes taking help and support from the
States of the region for PKK impossible. Moreover, it
divides the energy of PKK, since Turkey has got out to be
the only target. However, besides all these positive
factors, the solution of the problem has become harder.
Ceasing to be an issue in the respect of the
American-Turkish relationships, this problem has commenced
to be a part of the deal between Iran, Syria and Turkey.
This case makes the job of Turkey more difficult and the
motivation of the USA to put an end to PKK affects
negatively from this matter. Thus, the USA-Turkey
relationships became problematic. Moreover, this process
covers the potential of PKK to turn out to be a greater
problem in the future. In a case of a military intervention
toward Iran, a new formation in the Kurdish district of this
country could appear. Pushing PKK-PEJAK into Iran means that
the leadership of this possible structure would already
leave to this organization. Moreover, this situation could
present PKK an opportunity to create a “Kurdish belt” in the
Iranian-Kurdish border, which has been a dream of PKK for a
long time. By this way, Turkey could come face to face with
a Turk-Kurd hot-conflict on the Iranian border. For these
reasons, PKK-PEJAK’s channeling to Iran does not solve the
problem of Turkey.
The tension
between Iran and the USA and the radicalism of Ahmadinejad
could be more harmful to Turkey than it has ever thought of.
Thus, Turkey should take part in this process more actively.
Turkey should put an end to the problem of PKK-PEJAK in this
way or an other; even it could not manage to cease the
tension between the USA and Iran. It is very important to
hinder the future of PKK-PEJAK terrorist organization in
Iran right now before the Iranian-American tension comes to
the phase of “the final deal”.
